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ABSTRACT
STEALTH SANDBOX ANALYSIS OF MALWARE
O¨mer Sezgin Ug˘urlu
M.S. in Computer Engineering
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ali Aydin Selc¸uk
August, 2009
Malware is one of the biggest problems of the world of bits and bytes. Generally
malware does activities a user normally does not do, such as becoming part of a
virtual army or submitting confidential data of the user to the malware author.
There are publicly available analysis services for unknown binaries. Sandbox anal-
ysis is performed by execution of an untrusted binary in an isolated environment.
It is a very common technique for malware research. Publicly available sandbox
analysis platforms help users to see traces of the execution without harming their
system. Also it helps owners of the sandbox to collect malware and makes the
job of analysts easier. One major problem of the public sandbox testing is that
malware authors can also benefit from analysis of sandboxes. If they can identify
sandbox systems they can hide malicious behavior. This thesis presents the pub-
licly used Anubis sandbox, detection mechanisms used against Anubis[3], further
possible detection mechanisms and our efforts for hiding fingerprint of Anubis
from malware and decreasing the resulting false negative rates for the malware
detection.
Keywords: malware analysis, sandbox analysis, stealth analysis.
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O¨ZET
GIZLI KUM BAHC¸ESI ILE KO¨TUCU¨L YAZILIM
ANALIZI
O¨mer Sezgin Ug˘urlu
Bilgisayar Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨ksek Lisans
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ali Aydin Selc¸uk
Ag˘ustos, 2009
Ko¨tu¨cu¨l yazılım bit ve baytlar du¨nyasının en bu¨yu¨k problemlerinden birisidir.
Genellikle ko¨tu¨cu¨l yazılımlar bir kullanıcının normalde yapmayacag˘ı, sanal bir
orduya u¨ye olmak, ya da kullanıcının kendi o¨zel bilgilerini ko¨tu¨cu¨l yazılımı yazan-
lara go¨ndermek gibi eylemleri gerc¸ekles¸tirirler. Bilinmeyen programlar ic¸in halka
ac¸ık analiz servisleri bulunmaktadır. Kum bahc¸esi analizi gu¨venilmeyen program-
ların izole ortamlarda c¸alıs¸tırılması ile yapılır. Bu yo¨ntem ko¨tu¨cu¨l yazılım anal-
izinde sık olarak kullanılan bir yo¨ntemdir. Kum bahc¸esi analizi ko¨tu¨cu¨l yazılım
analizinde o¨nemli bir tekniktir. Halka ac¸ık kum bahc¸esi analizi platformları, kul-
lanıcıların kendi bilgisayarlarına zarar vermeden programın c¸alıs¸ması sırasında
olus¸an izleri go¨rmelerine yardım eder. Halka ac¸ık kum bahc¸esi analizi ortam-
larının ana problemlerinden biri de ko¨tu¨cu¨l yazılım sahiplerinin de servisleri kul-
lanabilmesidir. Eg˘er yazarlar kum bahc¸esi sistemlerini tanıyabilirlerse ko¨tu¨cu¨l
davranıs¸ları saklayabilirler. Bu tez halka ac¸ık olan Anubis[3] sistemi ic¸in, bilinen
tespit sistemlerini, bilinmeyen olası tespit sistemlerini ve bizim Anubis’in par-
mak izlerini ko¨tu¨cu¨l yazılımlardan saklama ve ko¨tu¨cu¨l yazılım tespitindeki hatalı
negatif oranlarını du¨s¸u¨rme c¸abalarımızı sunmaktadır.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : ko¨tu¨cu¨l yazılım, kum bahc¸esi analizi, gizli analiz.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Each time a computer user executes a software he has a list of strong expectations.
Generally these expectations are related with the functionality of the software.
If it works, everything is perfect. Source or trustability of the software is not
generally a concern.
Using digital signature mechanisms may establish trust on source of software.
But still there is the risk of malicious behavior. We may take legal steps for
software provider in case of malicious behavior. Since software is electronically
signed we can be sure that software is authentic. It is not changed after the
signature process. But conserved integrity does not imply security. Software may
be created with malicious behavior in mind or it may be infected before signing
process. Therefore the signed binary files are also may be secure and subject to
future analysis.
Malware, the short form of “Malicious Software”, is the type of software which
is designed to perform malicious activities, without the owner’s informed consent.
Activities may involve information damage, information theft, zombie1 in a DoS2
attack.
1A zombie computer is a computer attached to the Internet that has been compromised by
a hacker, a computer virus, or a Trojan horse
2Denial of Service
1
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Anti-virus software may flag the binary as malicious by using signature de-
tection or the heuristic approaches. Anti-virus vendors extract signatures from
binary streams to identify malicious files. Scanning files for extracted signatures
is the fastest way of detection. As a tradeoff it can fail to detect slightly modified
malicious binaries.
While detection using signatures is fast, generation of malware signatures is
not. It requires expert analyzers to work on subjects. It’s a costly process. If
tools gather high level information like a report the software classification may be
done much faster. Human readable high level execution trace report gives better
oral representation of software execution trace.
With high level report execution trace report, power users may want to see
what action is taken by the unknown binary. Which files are modified, which
registry values are read etc.. Analysis procedure may damage the the host envi-
ronment. To prevent damage software may executed in a isolated environment
which is called as sandbox. But not every expert may setup a sandbox for in
house testing. Executing the software on a remotely hosted sandbox is probably
the most sterile testing method. Code may behave and nuke the whole system.
The harm will be done in sandbox and will not cause any damage on host envi-
ronment.
Anubis [3] is a Web front end for TTanalyze [5] sandbox environment for
Malware analysis. Automated bots or computer users may upload portable exe-
cutable (PE) [21] files to obtain high-level reports of binary behavior. Uploaded
binaries are executed in a virtual machine.
One major problem with Anubis environment is it’s availability. Anubis is
both available to malware analyzers, victims and malware authors. Usage of
the system analyzers and victims is desired. But if malware authors can detect
presence of Anubis, then they may hide their malicious activity. The idea is
similar to malware signature. However instead of extracting signature from a
binary file, signature is generated from running sandbox environment. MAC
address of Ethernet device, or hard disk serial ID of sandbox image can be used to
generate fingerprint. A signature of sandbox may lead to detection of sandbox by
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malware. Malware may behave like normal software and hide malicious behavior.
Therefore generated reports can be used to establish trust in malicious software,
which may cause more damage. Level of trust is increased from “unknown” to
“seems safe”. Traces seen in the reports seem totally normal.
My additions to Anubis will try to remove its fingerprints and provide an invis-
ible shield for the viewpoint of subject analysis binaries. Ideas can be summarized
as providing random execution environment for analysis of binaries. Trackable
properties of system will be randomized using a key derived from the hash. There-
fore execution of the same binary will lead to same execution trace. But with
different binaries traceable system properties will be different. Fingerprint ex-
tracted for one binary won’t match for another one. Therefore there will be no
fingerprint for Anubis and malware won’t be able to detect Anubis by looking at
its fingerprint.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides basic background information regarding malware, basic
analysis of malware, tools used for malware analysis, Anubis, Anubis like plat-
forms for malware analysis, Windows internals especially related to fingerprint-
ing, and hardware components and fingerprint extraction. This chapter does not
provide any solution for described problem.
2.1 Malware
Malware is a common name for all kinds of unwanted software such as viruses,
worms, trojans and jokes. [10]
Being an unwanted piece of software most of the time, malware should be
able to cover its traces to survive. Malware can be detected by software or by
abnormal behavior of the system. A pop-up about our computer being in danger
or crazy flashing network lights can be caused by malware. If malware somehow
is detected, it can be further analyzed.
4
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2.1.1 Malware Analysis
In order to understand structure and behavior of malware a sophisticated ana-
lyzer is needed. With strong skills in software, machine architecture, assembly
and network. In terms of cost such sophisticated professionals cost too much.
Therefore we need automated systems to decrease load in those professionals.
2.1.1.1 Static Analysis
Static analysis depends on observations on disassembled code. Analysis is done
without executing the binary. By tracing the disassembled binary control and/or
data flow graphs can be generated. However it can be problematic in case of self
modifying binaries.
This sort of analysis does not cause any harm or infection on host computer.
Guest binaries are opened but not executed. Therefore malicious behavior can’t
have any persistent effect on host computer. In one extreme case infection can
occur is the case where analyzer software has bug in it’s parser. Therefore ex-
ecution of analysis might cause execution of arbitrary code. Example to this is
tcpdump binary. It’s a binary for network traffic inspection. Tcpdump had a bug
which caused specially crafted packets to execute code on the machine running
tcpdump.
2.1.1.2 Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis is done by executing binary and collecting any traces that
are created during execution. The behavior of the suspected binary is care-
fully watched. Any interaction between the malicious binary and the system are
recorded.
One big major problem with dynamic analysis is trace-ability of only execution
path. Alternate paths are not taken into account. So if malware does not activate
itself, we won’t be able trace malicious execution.
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2.2 Tools
This section provides information about industry standard tools used in reverse
engineering. Generally this tools are designed to be used against binary code. No
source code is input is necessary while using this tools against binary files.
2.2.1 Detours
Detours [13] is a library for interception of Windows functions. It modifies exe-
cution redirecting Windows API call to detour function created by user.
An example scenario regarding use of detours is as follow: You have a binary
file, which is modifying data on a block device. You want to know what is written
or read exactly on to that block device. You want to hook ReadFile function.
The execution in normal scenario is your program calls ReadFile function in
kernel32.dll.
binary --> kernel32.dll --> hard disk
When you create detours function for that file the execution is like
binary --> detours_function --> hard disk
Instead of ReadFile function detours function you have created for that
file is executed. What can you do with a detours function is completely up to
you. You can redirect parameters to a file before calling kernel32’s ReadFile
function. Or you don’t do anything at all. By detouring multiple calls even non
existent components on a system.
In summary this tool can be used to change the communication between the
binary and the libraries. This is a common approach in reverse engineering.
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2.2.2 IDA
“IDA Pro is a Windows or Linux hosted multi-processor disassembler and debug-
ger that offers so many features it is hard to describe them all.”1 For our work
we used free version of IDA Pro Freeware [8]. It’s a great tool for static analy-
sis. It provides graphical navigation through binary components. Implements a
few anti-anti-disassembly techniques. For example a common technique is using
invalid opcodes in binary. Invalid locations are known by the author and they are
never executed by binaries. When disassembler try to disassemble them they fail,
becaue they don’t execute code. Maps calls to human readable function names.
For example a call to dll function is reflected to user.
For manual static analysis of suspect binaries we used IDA.
2.2.3 Objdump
We used objdump tool from mingw32 package. It displays information about
object files. It’s main targeted user base is people working on compilation tools, or
low level binary inspection techniques. It can parse and display various resources
on an object file. It can display most of the information displayed by IDA. Which
includes, function imports, function exports, resource segments, etc.. It is a part
of GNU suite.
In static analysis this tool is also used to gather information.
2.2.4 Sysinternals Tools
Sysinternals tools [26] work by hooking various functions on Windows kernel.
Accesses to Windows Registry or file system can be monitored with this tools.
Filemon shows Windows file system activity, and Regmon shows Windows reg-
istry activity item.
1http://www.hex-rays.com/idapro/
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By providing filters this tools can monitor behavior of a specific binary. This
tools belong to the category of dynamic analysis, since it requires code to be
executed.
2.3 Analysis Platform
Our analysis platform is Anubis which is both a static and a dynamic analysis
environment. It analyzes binary by dynamic execution. But in terms of being
malware hostile to host system it has same properties with static analysis.
Major problem with dynamic analysis is also a problem of Anubis. Since
Anubis only traces the execution it leaves a hole for malware authors. If malware
detects Anubis it can simply not execute malicious behavior routines. Therefore
system may not show real-world activity of the malicious binary.
2.3.1 QEMU
QEMU [6] is a fast machine emulator. It’s a freely available open source project
authored by Fabrice Bellard. Since it’s an emulator, it can host unmodified guest
operating systems. It can emulate various architectures on various hosts. QEMU
can run on x86, PowerPC, ARM, Sparc, Alpha and MIPS platforms to host x86,
PowerPC, ARM and Sparc CPUs. System consists of several components:
• CPU
• emulated VGA display
• serial port
QEMU runs fast using portable dynamic translator in blocks. In summary
this technique converts executable code from guest instruction set to host instruc-
tion set, from current execution point to next jump point. Therefore instead of
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Figure 2.1: QEMU dynamic translation
Figure 2.2: Anubis architecture
converting every single instruction one-by-one block translation technique com-
piles these instructions. This reduces context switching operations so the overall
performance of emulated system increases.
2.3.2 Anubis
Main idea of Anubis is tracking the calls to the operating system in the CPU level.
Internal trace & execution operations are done without any memory fingerprint.
But the process to launch suspect binary may leave some fingerprint.
Anubis can be considered as a modified machine emulator. It’s basic engine is
extended from well known machine emulator QEMU. For emulation environment
it uses modified QEMU source. It has Windows operating system installed inside.
It is slightly customized in sense of network IP address, wallpaper an execution
daemon for observing C:\ drive. When the analyze script is executed, subject
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binary is copied into Windows instance running inside modified QEMU. Execu-
tion daemon executes the subject binary and the system collects the results, and
presents them in multiple output formats.
2.3.2.1 Binary Tracing with Anubis
Anubis can trace execution of win32 binaries. Since it’s using an emulator it has
low level view of the system. For every executed instruction, we have the view
of complete CPU. All registers are accessible by us. For matching this low level
view with higher level application view, Anubis uses CPU registers. There are
basically two problems solved by Anubis. Matching the application with CPU
instruction, and matching the DLL call with CPU instruction.
Anubis makes application trace feasible by using the CR3 register a.k.a
PDBR2 on x86 architecture. It has unique value for each process. Since it has
unique value for every process, it can be used to match CPU instructions with
running process. It’s reloaded on each context switch. Therefore it can always
be trusted as a pointer for process.
The second problem solved by Anubis is matching DLL calls with CPU in-
structions. Problem of matching executed machine code with the Windows op-
erating system DLLs. In win32 system functions resting in system DLLs has
constant entry points. We can access this entry points using tools like nm, obj-
dump. QEMU processes instructions in blocks. By comparing these entry points
with EIP we can find out which function is called. This logic is executed in ev-
ery block start. By tapping into execution start of each block, Anubis manages
to intercept any DLL call. Also value returned by the call can be manipulated.
Simple illustration can be seen in Figure 2.5
If we combine the values of CR3 & EIP registers, we can match the currently
executed instruction with the corresponding process and win32 API call.
2page-directory base register is uniquely assigned by Windows operating system to each
process
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After determining the called function we might access in and out parameters
with the help of stack information. In 32 bit Windows systems each parameter
takes 32 bits of memory in stack. Knowing number and type of parameters we
can access internals of API calls.
2.3.2.2 Components of Anubis
Anubis has several components. generator.exe is a tool to for code generation.
It generates callback handlers for win32 functions. Given function names, param-
eter types and parameter names, it automatically generates Callback interfaces.
For each function generator creates 2 classes. An interface class and a decoder
class. For example for GetComputerNameA method GetComputerNameADecoder
and GetComputerNameAInterface classes are generated. The generated interface
class declares the method interfaces for execution callback. Decoder class is used
to obtain the physical addresses in the address space of QEMU. Since QEMU
has an internal MMU, addresses in QEMU and host operating system aren’t the
same.
Interface class defines 2 methods for every function a WasCalled method and
a HasReturned method. As the names imply former one is to be invoked before
the call is started and the later one is invoked after the execution of function by
the operating system installed inside the QEMU. Figure 2.3 is a sample inter-
face class for GetComputerNameA method and Figure 2.4 is decoder class for
GetComputerNameA method. Decoder class has members for each parameter.
VirtualAddress member for each parameter and according to parameter is in and
or out there are members accordingly. This duplicate members helps one class
to hold both before and after data.
2.3.2.3 Anubis Public Interface
Anubis is malware analysis reports are publicly available. Users can upload any
binary they are suspected. After upload any user may obtain detailed reports.
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class GetComputerNameAInterface: public CCallbackObject
{
public:
virtual ~GetComputerNameAInterface() {}
virtual void GetComputerNameAWasCalled(
int8_t *lpBuffer,
uint32_t *nSize) {}
virtual void GetComputerNameAHasReturned(
int8_t *lpBuffer,
uint32_t *nSize,
int32_t _functionResult) {}
};
Figure 2.3: Generated interface class for GetComputerNameA method
There major drawback of this openness. Anubis is also open to malware authors.
Anubis leaks information about underlying infrastructure. Generated reports
may be used as a side-channel to transfer fingerprint information to users. For
example, value of a registry key is displayed in reports. If it carries unique
information of that system, that will lead to disclosure of fingerprint information.
2.3.3 Automated Analysis Suite
Automated Analysis Suite3 is an Anubis like system. The Automated Analysis
Suite consists of two major components:
• Nepenthes [1]: Nepenthes’ main aim is to collect malware. It achieve this
task by emulating known vulnerabilities without giving full execution rights.
Nepenthes emulates being exploited, therefore permits and targets auto-
mated download of malware. It’s publicly available.
• CWSandbox: Main automated dynamic analysis component of the system
is CWSandbox [31]. CWSandbox provides malware analysis environment
3http://www.sunbeltsoftware.com/Developer/Sunbelt-CWSandbox/
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class GetComputerNameADecoder: public CallbackDecoder
{
private:
int8_t *lpBuffer_out;
VirtualAddress lpBuffer_addr;
uint32_t *nSize_out;
uint32_t *nSize_in;
VirtualAddress nSize_addr;
int32_t _functionResult;
public:
GetComputerNameADecoder() :
lpBuffer_out(NULL),
nSize_out(NULL),nSize_in(NULL) {}
virtual ~GetComputerNameADecoder();
VirtualAddress getlpBuffer_addr() const {
return lpBuffer_addr;}
VirtualAddress getnSize_addr() const {
return nSize_addr;}
static CallbackDecoder* createObject() {
return new GetComputerNameADecoder();}
virtual std::string getFunctionName () const {
return "GetComputerNameA";}
virtual void functionWasCalled(
uint32_t threadId,
const std::vector<CCallbackObject*> &cbs);
virtual void functionHasReturned(
uint32_t threadId,
const std::vector<CCallbackObject*> &cbs);
};
Figure 2.4: Generated decoder class for GetComputerNameA method
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Figure 2.5: Anubis call manipulation and interception capability
using the same approach as Anubis. By recording Windows API calls the
subject binary makes CWSandbox [31] can generate detailed reports. In
addition to Anubis, CWSandbox can also analyze various forms of docu-
ments, including MS Office, Adobe Flash, malicious web sites. The only
requirement is setup of a Windows sandbox environment.
2.4 Windows
This section provides information about Windows API. Ideas of possible finger-
printing locations are also discussed. But ideas are further discussed in Chapter
4. Internals of Windows API are obtained from Microsoft Developer Network
[22].
2.4.1 Registry API
The Windows Registry is a special form of database to store various parame-
ters. It can provide both information and storage. Microsoft Windows operating
system, services, and applications.
Initial aim of the Windows Registry was providing a single source for config-
uration files. Instead of INI based configuration of pre 3.1 releases of Windows,
the registry was introduced as a new approach.
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#include <winreg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(){
HKEY key;
DWORD varType = REG_SZ;
char buffer[256];
RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_CURRENT_USER,
"HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control"
"\\ComputerName\\ActiveComputerName",
0, KEY_READ, key);
printf("Computer Name is %s\n", key);
RegCloseKey(key);
}
Figure 2.6: Sample code to read computer name from registry.
The Windows Registry provides INI like interface. Registry has two major
components:
Registry Keys: Keys can have sub-keys, which can resemble folder structure.
Key hierarchies can be denoted using backslashes. A\B\C means B is a subkey
of A and C is a subkey of B.
Registry Values, are the various forms of data in the form of dictionary, that’s
stored in the keys.
Reading a registry key consists of three fundamental Windows calls. Opening
a key reading value and closing the key. While opening a key, a handle is created.
Values are queried over this handle. And then the handle is closed. Typical code
is shown in Figure 2.6.
2.4.2 File API
All of the persistent information are organized in hard disk, and accessed by
file system API. Files have contents and attributes. Creation, modification and
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List of Registry Value Types
0 REG NONE No type
1 REG SZ A string value
2 REG EXPAND SZ An ”expandable” string value that can contain
environment variables
3 REG BINARY Binary data (any arbitrary data)
4 REG DWORD A DWORD value, a 32-bit unsigned integer
REG DWORD LITTLE ENDIAN (numbers between 0 and 4,294,967,29 5 [232 – 1])
(little-endian)
5 REG DWORD BIG ENDIAN A DWORD value, a 32-bit unsigned integer
(numbers between 0 and 4,294,967,295 [232 – 1])
(big-endian)
6 REG LINK symbolic link (UNICODE)
7 REG MULTI SZ A multi-string value, which is an array of
unique strings
8 REG RESOURCE LIST Resource list
9 REG FULL RESOURCE DESCRIPTOR Resource descriptor
10 REG RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS LIST Resource Requirements List
11 REG QWORD A QWORD value, a 64-bit integer
REG QWORD LITTLE ENDIAN (either big- or little-endian, or unspecified)
(Introduced in Windows 2000)
Table 2.1: List of Registry Value Types
access times are stored as file attributes. Among different installations some files
will probably differ. When we read a file we change last access time. When we
modify a file we change last write time. Since accesses changes time information
in attribute data, one may simply find a time-stamp on a file, which can be used as
fingerprint. Also if any system wise unique file is created, or has unique content,
this might also be used as a fingerprint. For Windows systems file attribute
structure is shown in figure 2.7. If the topic is files we can choose to overwrite
attribute data as well as contents of the file itself.
File attributes don’t provide any evidence. They provide protection or comfort
for the file. A hidden file takes more clicks to delete for example.
Data content on the files are also can be altered. But attention is needed. It
should not invalidate the system integrity.
File I/O life chain is similar to registry life chain. Files are opened, processed
and closed. Handles are created during opening process. For processing or closing
files, these handles are used.
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typedef struct _WIN32_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DATA {
DWORD dwFileAttributes;
FILETIME ftCreationTime;
FILETIME ftLastAccessTime;
FILETIME ftLastWriteTime;
DWORD nFileSizeHigh;
DWORD nFileSizeLow;
}WIN32_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DATA, *LPWIN32_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DATA;
Figure 2.7: Win32 File Attribute Data Structure
2.4.3 Screen
By looking at the desktop and the wallpaper, sometimes we’re also able to identify
systems. If a custom and non-standard wallpaper is used or if any part of the
screen constantly holds the same unique image, this image may be used as a
fingerprint.
2.4.4 Memory
Similar to screen scenario, memory parts if can be identified, can be used as a
fingerprint. Memory also contains a wallpaper, handles, processes, etc.. .
There are two main points in memory. What is stored on a single block, and
where that block is stored. The stored information can be overridden if it does
not invalidate the consistency of system.
2.5 Hardware Identifiers
By hardware identifiers we mean the information embedded into hardware in
manufacturing process. This parameters meant to be unique and unmodifiable.
Therefore they can be used to identify a real system. Evaluation of these iden-
tifiers are explained below. The ideas regarding randomization will be further
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discussed in Chapter 4.
2.5.1 CPU Serial
Executing a few instructions gives unique results in most CPUs. Therefore it can
be considered as a strong fingerprint. CPUID instruction can be executed on CPUs
supporting it. Some of the modern CPUs has this feature. But the CPU emulated
by QEMU is Pentium II therefore it does not have this UniqueID feature.
Still after the theory we experimented with CPU-Z 4 and wbemtest.exe 5.
With both software we were not able to obtain CPU UniqueId parameter. CPU-
Z recognized our CPU as Intel Pentium II with Klamath code name. WBE-
MTest is used to query Win32 Processor.DeviceID=”CPU0”. UniqueId string is
reported as null.
2.5.2 Memory SPD
New memory modules has a chip called Serial Presence Detect (SPD). This tiny
chip has 8 pins and assembled in to memory PCB. It stores information about the
memory chips resting on the same memory module. The contained information
is used by BIOS to tune timings for the performance and stability. It also has an
additional space for storing serial numbers.
However, QEMU does not emulate SPD chip information. Again a hardware
based fingerprint for a normal system is not applicable for Anubis.
2.5.3 Ethernet MAC address
On a normal computer system Ethernet MAC address is stored in eprom of
Ethernet interface. These addresses are designed to be unique. This address is
4cpuz from http://cpuid.com
5“Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Tester, also called WBEMTest”
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composed of 6 bytes; the first 3 bytes identifies the manufacturer and the later
3 bytes are random. A manufacturer may have more than one identifiers. It’s
nearly impossible to have two machines with the same MAC address. Therefore
it’s a strong fingerprint.
The Ethernet MAC address is defined is defined in Anubis configuration file.
Since it is specified by the Anubis configuration we can change it in configura-
tion. But the problem with this is that, we’re not starting Windows from scratch.
Instead we have a sandbox image that’s executed up to a point. Changing param-
eters in configuration may not change active configuration. Also this information
is probably stored in persistent storage and Windows Registry. Besides persistent
storage, this address also might be cached in the memory.
2.5.4 Disk Information
Since all persistent information is stored on disk, emulated disk carries fingerprints
for the system. Segments of the disk covered by the file system are changeable
interceptable by the interception of file system I/O routines.
If a segment on the disk is used by a file, it can be perfectly manipulated.
Values returned by I/O calls can be intercepted. However a raw reading of disk,
without the view of file system can carry additional information.
The solution to this problem may be intercepting the file IO call in a read-only
manner. By using external file system tools raw disk image may be manipulated.
Chapter 3
Stealth Malware Analysis
Observation without disturbing the environment is a must for a successful obser-
vation. Since the observed subject can change it’s nature, any form of distribution
should be avoided. A nature photographer taking pictures of wild animals, may
not be able to take natural snapshots of the scene. This is the same case with
the malware.
Some copy protection libraries also like privacy. They want to execute routines
behind the doors. They prefer their action to stay hidden. If they detect a
debugger installed, even worse an active debugger, they may politely refuse to
execute validation routines. One of the software copy protection routine also
asked me to close my Filemon instance. Malware may not only hide its activity.
It can also disable protection software. An Agabot variant [9] for example can
detect and remove 105 anti-virus processes.
3.1 Virtualization
Increasing capacity on modern computer systems lead to over-qualification for
simple tasks. Also each service has possible bugs which may cause them to
be exploited. On the other hand with the help of Internet a huge number of
20
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clients are available as a client of a specific service. No specific single hardware
is powerful enough to handle this scenario. Virtualization and clustering gained
high importance because of this reasons.
Virtualization is gaining significant importance. Especially in server systems.
Disabling malware in virtual environments also limits it’s spread. So there is a
tradeoff. If malware blocks itself under virtualization, it will also self-block it is
habitat. Therefore malware authors might not check existence of any sort of VM
in future. But if the target of the malware is customer terminals like ordinary
desktop PCs, laptops, netbooks detection of virtualization is a good idea.
3.1.1 Virtualization Types
There are many types of virtualization which will be summarized below. Com-
ponents of a basic virtualization scheme are a virtual machine monitor (VMM),
which also can be referred as a hypervisor and a virtual machine (VM). VMMs
are installed on host operating systems. VMs are created inside VMMs and guest
operating systems are installed in VMs.
3.1.1.1 Emulation
This sort of systems emulates complete hardware, everything needed to run a
complete unmodified operating system. Components include CPU, chipsets, VGA
cards, disks, keyboards, etc., all components of a real system are emulated. They
can emulate different architectures on the platform they are running QEMU[6]
and Bochs[17] are examples of this kind.
3.1.1.2 Full Virtualization
Full virtualization systems known as virtual machine monitors (VMMs) emulate
components other than CPU. They give us the ability to run various unmodified
operating system for the same architecture in the same machine. VMware[30],
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QEMU[6], Microsoft Virtual Server [20], Parallels[24] are examples of this kind.
As of version 3.0 Xen[2] also supports this feature for x86 platform.
3.1.1.3 Paravirtualization
Instead of emulating a system they provide a special interface for guest systems.
Therefore running guest should be modified in order to be executable in that
hypervisor. Xen[2] is example of a such system. Linux kernel should be modified
in order to boot under Xen environment. UML[7] is also another example.
3.1.1.4 Hardware-supported Virtualization
Emulation done in emulators are done on CPUs this time. Newer CPUs having
virtualization support has this feature. In this scenario emulation of CPU is not
needed. VMMs are able to execute full unmodified operating systems.
3.1.2 Virtualization Detection
Malware or in case of copy protection case legitimate software, may also detect
and refuse to run in virtual environments. There are several virtualization tech-
niques as there are multiple ways to detect if execution is occurring in a virtualized
environment. Modern CPUs are quite complex. If they should be emulated with-
out leaving any trail, their bugs should be also modelled. Non-existence of a bug
in a certain CPU model clearly gives the being emulated idea.
One of the detection algorithms uses almost one instruction [27]. By execution
of SIDT1 instruction we are able to obtain IDTR2. According to obtained value
we might obtain presence of virtual machines. There is only one IDTR register
and this register is used by OS. If this instruction is executed in a VMM it does
1Store Interrupt Descriptor Table
2Interrupt Descriptor Table Register
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int swallow_redpill () {
unsigned char m[2+4], rpill[] =
"\x0f\x01\x0d\x00\x00\x00\x00\xc3";
*((unsigned*)&rpill[3]) = (unsigned)m;
((void(*)())&rpill)();
return (m[5]>0xd0) ? 1 : 0;
}
Figure 3.1: redpill virtualization detection
not generate exception so the process gets relocated address. This does not work
with QEMU because, QEMU also emulates CPU.
Another tool to check virtualization is ScoopyNG[15]. It performs 7 tests.
Tests are as follows:
• test1: IDT test a.k.a redpill test we mentioned above.
• test2: LDTR3 test
• test3: GDT4 test
• test4: Alfredo Andre´s Omella’s (S21sec) STR technique
• test5: VMware version test
• test6: VMware special I/O port test
• test7: Derek Soeder’s (eEye Digital Security) VMware emulation test
QEMU fails on test7 only. Test7 basically generates an exception and then it
compares exception address with EndUserModeAddress5 value.
More research yields [25, 11, 23] more interesting results. Instead of architec-
ture specific patterns for detection they use hardware specific patterns.
3Load Descriptor Table Register
4Global Descriptor Table
5(*(UINT PTR*)0x7FFE02B4)
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Ferrie [11] found several unrealistic behavior on QEMU. Mostly these finding
are related to CPUID instruction. Execution of CPUID does not give easter-egg
strings embedded into hardware AMD CPUs. A specific example from the paper
is instead of “AMD [processor name] Processor”, the string“QEMU Virtual CPU
version x..x..”. is returned.
Raffetseder [25] mostly tested if QEMU behaves like an emulated system by
documents from providers. Limitations applied by manufacturers are not em-
ulated by QEMU. Examples include Intel’s 15 byte instruction limit. #GP 6
exceptions are not raised. MSR 7s not implemented or reserved. Also another
interesting finding is QEMU or VMware refuse to disable cache. On real hard-
ware cache activation makes a difference, while on QEMU or VMware practically
there’s no difference between active cache and deactivated cache. They simply
ignore the instruction.
3.1.3 More Than Detection
Ormandy [23] did more than detecting a VM. He was able to find coding flaws. A
code running in guest machine is able to execute arbitrary code. Coding flaws in
VGA emulator, NE2000 Ethernet emulator, socket interface, sound card, DMA
controller, CPU emulator, BIOS, IDE controller. Basically most of the emulated
peripherals in QEMU (version 0.8.2) had flaws.
Findings of Ormandy means a specially crafted malware could execute code
on behalf of the Anubis process. Therefore malware would effect environment
outside the emulation system.
6General Protection
7Model-Specific Registers
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Figure 3.2: Cobra Architecture
3.2 Related Work
There are several framework for stealth malware analysis. They can be considered
as related work since their aim is hiding the analysis routines from the malware.
But their main focus is not hiding the publicly available, traceable, installation
specific finger prints of their environment. They [29, 14, 19] don’t hide or alter on
the OS instance they’re currently running on. Below there is summary of these
malware analysis environments.
3.2.1 Cobra
Cobra [29] employs a lightweight hypervisor like component Block Create and
eXecute Engine (BXCE). Blocks are code streams ending with a jump, or after
certain amount of instructions. Architecture is shown in figure 3.2.
Cobra is designed to be running on OS. It has kernel level and user level
components. It’s similar to the approach in Figure 3.3.
Cobra employs stealth-implants technique. It’s simply generating patches
for privileged instructions. Instead of executing a privileged instruction
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Figure 3.3: Traditional approach
(SIDT,SGDT,SLDT..), BXCE creates an implant. An implant is set of substi-
tutions for an instruction. These implants are designed to return values stored
in virtual registers. In QEMU this is already done, since QEMU is emulating a
complete platform.
Another manipulation done by Cobra is related to the instruction counter.
Cobra also maintains a clone register for RDTSC register to falsify amount of
clock-cycles.
3.2.2 VMwatcher
WMwatcher [14] is a VMM based malware detection system like Anubis. It’s
main focus is constructing the semantic view of the guest OS in the host OS.
They are trying to create in system like meaningful representation of the guest
OS.
In traditional analysis, everything is in the same box. Everything is sharing
the same kernel and hardware: Analyzed suspicious binary, files it’s using, anti-
malware software, analysis tools. This architecture has significant drawbacks.
Malware can alter the execution of anti-malware and lead to false-negatives. This
architecture is shown in Figure 3.3.
In VMwatcher approach, analysis software is separated from analysis envi-
ronment. Like Anubis, system observes malware behavior outside the box. But
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Figure 3.4: VMwatcher approach
the difference is it tries to construct a semantic view, to make out of the box
deployment of anti-virus software. Their experiment with the Windows version
Symantec anti-virus software is to detect malware instances in Linux VM honey-
pot.
The article [14] also mentioned fingerprinting problem. But instead of pointing
single instance of VMs, they talk about risk of using VMs. If malware detects VM,
it can shut itself. Increasing popularity of VMs makes decreases the increases the
chance of malware not showing it’s malicious behavior. Malware wants to create
malicious activity.
3.2.3 Malyzer
“The key idea of Malyzer [19] is to unveil malware camouflaging at startup and
runtime so that malware behavior can be accurately captured and distinguished.”
Malyzer creates a copy of the malicious process that’s mutually invisible to
original process in the host. Malyzer is not addressed to general public. There-
fore it does not need to eliminate it’s fingerprint. Anyway anti-detection ideas
from Malyzer is used. It’s architecture is shown in figure 3.5. It tracks processes
using startup tracker. Creates shadow process of the suspicious process. Man-
ages shadow process through shadow process manager. Finally information is
captured using shadow process manager.
Two types protection are provided by Malyzer. Internal anti-detection
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Figure 3.5: Malyzer Architecture, P2 is suspicious process
mechanism is checking only a single instance of malware is running. Exter-
nal anti-malware detection is checking of environment. For example if trojan
downloader searches for Wireshark, ZoneAlarm and Olly Debug.
The external anti-detection mechanisms have similar properties with what we
want to eliminate with eliminating fingerprint. This mechanisms are targeted
to larger users, instead of identifying automated analysis systems or honeynets.
We’re concentrating on systems accessible by public. If this system made available
to public, it will suffer from the same fingerprint issue with Anubis.
Malyzer intercepts Process32Next API call. Generally process list checking
is done by calling CreateToolhelp32Snapshot function. Then the process list
is enumerated by Process32Next function. Therefore overriding Process32Next
seems enough to hide running processes. Similarly ShowWindow call is inter-
cepted to activate only original process. While shadow process executes this call
nCmdShow is replaced with SW HIDE.
Malyzer interceptions are made through Detours Express. [13] Therefore in-
terception can be detected by the malware itself. Detours changes addresses of
the Windows API calls to itself. Therefore a self-checking malware might be able
to detect the modification.
Chapter 4
Stealth Anubis
Anubis is a public service. It gives automated results established by execution of
submitted binary. However this information can reveal information about Anubis
itself. The whole work in this thesis is finding and eliminating this type of unique
information. Unique information can be a product id as an example. Retail
license keys are unique for a computer under normal conditions.
During my research I haven’t encountered any mechanism designed to over-
come this issue. There exists mechanism to hide analysis programs, employed
by Anubis, Cobra, VMwatcher and Malyzer. They hide their analysis programs
from the running binary. However they are open to fingerprinting techniques
discussed.
Mainly two fingerprinting elimination schemes are proposed in this thesis.
On-the-fly call interception and off-line image modification. This techniques will
be discussed in this chapter with the experiments to extract randomizable data
points.
We start This chapter with an overview of known methods to detect Anubis
fingerprint. This is followed by additional information about known methods are
given. Then we discuess the procedure to extract more fingerprint information
and the results. Finally we present the methods proposed to eliminate these
29
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# Observer Comparison with Number of Number of
Samples Clusters
1 Windows Product Id of Anubis 55 28
2 Windows Product Id of CWSandbox 32 14
3 Windows Product Id of Joebox 32 14
4 Executable name of sample.exe 35 17
5 Computer name of Anubis 4 4
6 Qemu’s HD name 2 2
7 VMWare’s HD name 1 1
8 Windows user name of ’user’ 2 2
A Any Anti-Anubis comparison 99 54
B Any Anti-Sandbox comparison 100 55
Table 4.1: Anti-Sandbox detection mechanism encountered in sample database
fingerprints.
4.1 Known Sandbox Detection Mechanisms
As a starting point we might investigate work of Bayer et al. [4]. A study
conducted on 901,294 malware samples which is all samples submitted to Anubis
between February 7th 2007 and January 14th 2009. This malware samples are
unique according to their MD5 hashes.
Table 4.1 shows know anti-sandbox mechanisms. Some of the mechanisms
employed are in the category of detecting system emulators. Some other are
specifically designed to detect a specific sandbox. As compared to whole submis-
sions ratio is only 0.03
Mechanism 1, 2 and 3 work by querying a simple registry location.
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current Version\ProductID
This location provides ProductID for active Windows XP installation. Details
related to internals of the relation of this id with the product key used to install
Windows XP is discussed in [12]. Simple summary regarding ProductID is below.
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Format of a product key is in the form of AAAAA-BBB-CCCCCCC-DDEEE.
AAAAA part is nearly identical for a provider in Windows XP. Part BBB is part
of raw product key or string OEM for OEM installations. CCCCCCC is a part
of raw product key. DD is public key index and EEE is just a random value.
Minimalist approach is only changing EEE part. Changing both last 4 digits of
CCCCCCC and all digits of EEE will probably both preserve string format and
keep id validatable. However performing additional ProductID format checks is
beyond the scope this thesis.
Mechanism 4 checks if the name of executed binary matches with sample.exe
string. This check is done with GetModuleFileName function. This function has 3
parameters. If it’s called with first parameter having NULL value, process returns
the location of the binary that is calling the function. It’s easy to override this
function but if additional checks are made with file name such as controlling if file
exists, former checks would fail. This check does not work with Anubis. Anubis
can execute any file name. This check exists to check former version.
Mechanism 5 checks the name of ComputerName. The name for Anubis is
user. This is obtained by GetComputerName method. This method internally
reads associated registry key. Manipulation can be done in both registry record,
or by intercepting the function.
Mechanism 6,7 determine the name associated with emulated disks. For
QEMU it is QEMU. Since it is sort of detection for QEMU it outside our scope.
Because there exists more advanced probing techniques for virtual machine de-
tection.
Mechanism 8 checks the name of process owner. In old versions of Anubis it
was user later it has been changed to Administrator which is standard admin-
istrator account that exists in every Windows XP operating system.
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4.2 Possible Detection Points
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current Version
Location contains additional information than queried with known detection
mechanisms. Additional fields include
• DigitalProductId binary coded product id with additional information.
• InstallDate DWORD value storing data of installation
• LicenseInfo binary license information
Modification of these values would make Windows XP activation scheme to de-
activate Windows. That would lead to blocking of Windows XP.
4.3 Differences Between Installations
For achieving successful results we should now what kind of differences exist
between various installations. This differences can be taken while:
• When installation is done on different times
• When installation is done with different product key
• When additional software is installed
• When different programs are executed
Analyzing this snapshots can lead us to possible fingerprints.
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4.4 Defining Differences / Finding Fingerprints
We’re trying to provide a framework for randomization. A randomizable resource,
randomization quantity and method. And we’ll integrate it into Anubis to elim-
inate signature. This section discusses the methodology used to find differences
between two installations. We will try to install identical OSes to identical virtual
hardware. The only initial difference will be serial numbers. And we will try to
obtain differences.
For eliminating the fingerprint of an installation we should have a destination.
Differences, which can be considered as fingerprint should be clearly specified.
For this purpose we’ll try to generate identical installations on hardware with
identical serial numbers. We observed the differences between these installations.
Anubis launches suspect binaries with the same snapshot. This makes analysis
quite fast. This method has the disadvantage of having the same memory image
everywhere.
A partial solution to this problem might be defining randomizable bytes in
the snapshot image. If we are able to find such magical bytes in the image, we
can randomize VM before loading snapshot. This will lead to dynamically fin-
gerprinted snapshots. This approach would perfectly work if the given conditions
are satisfied:
• Positioning of data: If data is uncompressed and stored using without any
modification, it is clearly accessible. For example, modification of a string is
easy if we can clearly find in raw disk image using a normal search operation,
we can change raw disk image. But if it’s compressed or divided, we should
look from the higher API. We can execute grep function in files of file
system. By using this approach we can override a complete image file for
example.
• Preserving consistency: If any single bit we change on the image should
match within data in another location of the snapshot, we loose consistency.
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Algorithm MiB / Cycles Microseconds Cycles
Second Per Byte to Setup to Setup
VMAC(AES)-64 1519 1.1 3.133 5734
VMAC(AES)-128 779 2.2 3.738 6841
CRC32 253 6.9 - -
Adler32 920 1.9 - -
MD5 255 6.8 - -
SHA-1 153 11.4 - -
SHA-256 111 15.8 - -
SHA-512 99 17.7 - -
Tiger 214 8.1 - -
Table 4.2: Selected Hash Function Benchmarks
This might lead to malfunctioning system. Also changes made in license
fields may invalidate installation.
For file comparison we need a fast hash function. Speed is more important
than security on this project. A comparison of functions from cryptopp1 leads to
use of VMAC (AES) - 64[16] it has nearly 6 times better performance than MD5.
Table 4.2 provides brief summary of benchmark.
However simple code implemented to utilize the library had worse performance
than md5sum utility on a Debian system. Figures for a 650M image 2.7s average
for MD5, 3.3s average for VMAC. Due to this reason we prefer using md5sum.
4.4.1 Virtual Machine Setup
For performing our comparisons and experiments three Windows XP Professional
instances are installed. Virtual machines, and in case of QEMU only virtual disks
are need to be created first. [18]
First and second installations share the same product key. Second and third
share same ComputerName and Organization.
We start by creating persistent storage units. 3 qcow2 disk images are created
1http://www.cryptopp.com/benchmarks.html, retrieved on 21.07.2009
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with command:
$ for i in {0..2}; do \
qemu-img create -f qcow2 img$i.qcow2 4G; \
done
The produced image files have size of 28672Bytes and md5sum of
65287344ab282042a3f9cafd30b37f5d. Files are totally identical in this stage.
qcow2 format supports expanding. It does not have to be initially 4GB to support
a 4GB file system.
Then we used Microsoft Windows XP Professional image sp3 integrated with
hash of f424a52153e6e5ed4c0d44235cf545d5.
Installation is done in virtual machine with 256MB of memory with command:
$ qemu -m 256 -cdrom \
en_windows_xp_professional_with_service_pack_3_x86_cd_x14-80428.iso \
-hda img0.qcow2 -boot d
Everything is left as default. Installation is done with user names, user0,
user1, user2. Organization and owner names are specified as SETUP NAME,
SET NAME1, SET NAME2. Timezone is set to Turkey’s timezone. ComputerName
is left as proposed by installation application. Formatting is used as NTFS.After
the installation procedure, we start analyzing file systems and registry contents.
4.4.2 File Comparison
We compared information obtained from installed system. Also we extracted
parameters including time stamps and MD5 hashes. For each file disk image
we created a flat CSV 2 file consisting of, file type (file or directory), md5hash,
2Comma separated values, Comma delimited
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Directory 0 vs 1 0 vs 2 1 vs 2
WINDOWS 857 873 888
Documents and Settings 251 250 248
Program Files 2 2 2
System Volume Restore 51 59 59
Total 1161 1185 1197
Table 4.3: Number of different for files in nearly identical systems.
file list atime mtime ctime
list0 3 16 2
list1 2 15 1
list2 2 15 1
list3 23 722 6
list4 58 602 118
Table 4.4: Comparison of unique dates (in days) in a system.
atime 3, mtime 4, ctime 5 and file name. Figures are extracted while file system
is mounted as read-only using ntfs-3g driver for Linux.
Table 4.4 summarizes unique dates found in different sets. list0, list1, list2
correspond to fresh installs mentioned above. list3 set is extracted from Anubis
image and finally list4 is extracted from a random PC. According to the result
we can clearly conclude that all machines except 4th were running for only few
days. Table also shows us the image creation process for Anubis took 6 different
days. On the other hand 4th machine has been running for at least 118 days.
Surprisingly nearly 10% of files found to have different hashes in fresh nearly
identical installations. Number of different files are shown in table 4.3. Most
common extensions of different files are as follows: 56 log, 90 lnk, 31 pf, 692
PNF, 21 dat, 15 LOG. Locations of these files are in table 4.3.
Figures clearly conclude that a system that’s being in use has values of ctime’s
spread across the dates. Figure 4.4 is a clear example. Limited usage of Anubis
3time of most recent access
4most recent modification
5time of creation
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Figure 4.1: Dates in a new Installation 1
 0
 2000
 4000
 6000
 8000
 10000
 12000
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Co
un
t
Date
Times of Files
atime
mtime
ctime
Figure 4.2: Dates in a new Installation 2
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Figure 4.3: Dates in current Anubis image
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Figure 4.4: Dates from a running system
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image is shown in figure 4.3, while fresh installed systems has nearly all files
created in same day. Histograms of clearly installed systems are in Figures 4.1
and 4.2.
Any file can be used as a fingerprint for the Anubis system. Access times
cannot be trusted since they can easily change, but a specific file with a specific
date is a strong fingerprint. Also spectrum of the dates is another fingerprint. If
a system has only 6 unique modification or creation days one may conclude that
system is not actively used. And even if malware alters the system configuration
malware can simply ignore to run on this system.
Particular solution to file system dates may be modifying dates of file in a
random manner. However this would lead to long run times. We can randomize
file system dates by intercepting file related functions including FindFirstFile,
FindFirstFileEx, GetFileAttributes, GetFileAttributesEx. Further de-
tails are discussed in Section 4.5.4.
4.4.3 Registry Comparison
Windows Registry stores vast amount of system information. For comparison of
registry, system wide Windows Registry has been dumped with [28] to a CSV file.
Since nearly every application modifies registry, it is not preferable to compare
registry dumps of two running machines. Instead we focus on the differences
just after the initial installation. Therefore only registries of 3 generated virtual
machines img0, img1, img2 are compared.
After detection of unique registry values for these 3 images, these values are
compared with img3. The keys found are different in such a small set. We can
clearly conclude that the key values found in Anubis image will likely to be strong
fingerprint.
However we cannot change these values in a random manner. For example
the case with ProductID defined in Section4.1 has strict formatting rules.
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Unique values can have various forms. We started with keys. Registry keys are
similar to folders of file system. Several forms of differences have been observed.
Comparisons are done between img0 and img2.
Example 1:
/Software/Microsoft/NetDDE/DDE Trusted Shares/
D0178F2AB - D0F490750
Key in the chain has possible form of D || a random DWORD
Example2:
/Software/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion
/Internet Settings/5.0/Cache/Extensible Cache/
MSHist012009082120090822 - MSHist012009082220090823
Example in this key has time information encoded.
Example3:
/ControlSet001/Control/DeviceClasses/{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}/
##?#STORAGE#Volume#1&30a96598&0&Signature22F722F6Offset7E00 \
LengthFF6D1400#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
##?#STORAGE#Volume#1&30a96598&0&Signature32143214Offset7E00 \
LengthFF6D1400#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
String after Signature is a random DWORD.
Example 4:
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/ControlSet001/Control/DeviceClasses/{ad498944-762f-11d0-8dcb-00c04fc3358c}
/##?#PCI#VEN_10EC&DEV_8029&SUBSYS_11001AF4&REV_00#3&13c0b0c5&0&18
#{ad498944-762f-11d0-8dcb-00c04fc3358c}/
#{70C404A4-E712-467A-9740-318247AA21A2}
#{A6E2D95A-74E9-428D-8F89-214E8BABCC24}
Observed pattern here is actually universally unique identifier. Which has 2128
bits. Details are provided in Section 4.5.
4.5 Proposed Solution: On-The-Fly Fingerprint
elimination
In a specific time instance of operating system’s execution, there are many points
that can be considered as a fingerprint. Even after complete reboot of the operat-
ing system, there are custom points remain same, and unique to that installation
only.
The idea of eliminating fingerprint depends on simple randomization. By ap-
plying substitution or XOR’ing a bit mask to unique values, without reinstalling
the complete operating system, or restarting it we might have a system behaving
like another one.
Every I/O routine may be used for fingerprint extraction. E.g serial numbers
for hardware (BIOS, CPU, Memory), installation specific values, Ethernet MAC
id. An installation specific value can be created in various ways. A randomly
generated 128 bit string has 3.4 x 1038 possible values. Which means if we can
create 1 trillion UUIDs every nanosecond, it will take a little more than 10 billion
years to consume all possible UUIDs. If the seeds used to feed algorithm is chosen
carefully while generating UUID, even one instance can be a strong fingerprint.
While changing the signature preserving consistency is important. The change
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in data must be minimal, while satisfying the consistency. There is a tradeoff
between the number of bits changed, and the established randomness.
4.5.1 Pseudo Randomness
System unique points should be randomized, but in order to track this randomiza-
tion procedure should be carefully recorded and for every source it should return
the same unique output. If any binary reads a static registry record, it should
return the same values all the time. Reading of a constant source should always
return the same results. If the binary modifies the value, binary should obtain
the same results.
For generating such deterministic random bits (rb) we can use hash functions.
rb = HASH(secret|HASH(binary)|unique resource id) (4.1)
This function helps us to achieve easily traceable randomness. We can deter-
mine random bits needed to randomize the string.
• secret is an organization wide secret
• HASH(binary) is hash of the binary being analyzed
• unique resource id is a value that is unique for a given query. For a registry
value, it can be full key path.
For every different value type, we should plan randomization carefully. Plain
usage of rb is not enough, and probably will lead to a malfunctioning system.
4.5.2 String Randomizer
For any resource randomizer component works the following way. It reads the
input, applies randomization mask described in table 4.5. The length of the mask
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Code Meaning
. preserve character
H place a random hex-digit (upper-case)
h place a random hex-digit (lower-case)
D place a digit
A place a random letter [A-Z]
a place a random letter [a-z]
1 XOR 1 random bit
2 XOR 2 random bit
3 XOR 3 random bit
4 XOR 4 random bit
5 XOR 5 random bit
6 XOR 6 random bit
Table 4.5: Value randomization table
and value should be same. As a parameter randomizer takes random bits from
calculated rb with the help of registry or file randomizer classes.
4.5.3 Anubis Call Interception
Basic information of call interception is given in section 2.3.2.2. Detours[13]
like call manipulation is implemented in functions regarding Windows Registry
operations, Windows file system functions and few other functions. Implemented
manipulation works as follows
Before a Windows API function is called, Anubis redirects this call into
...WasCalled method. This function is the point where we can modify pa-
rameters going into Microsoft Windows implementation of routines. For example
if it’s a file open function called with parameter fileA, and we change the pa-
rameter to fileB in this stage, calling binary will think it’s opening fileA, but
it is going to open fileB. The size of the strings should be identical to overcome
issues regarding memory allocation of the guest OS.
After Microsoft Windows implemented execution of the specific kernel func-
tion ...HasReturned is executed. If we continue with previous example, we can
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restore value fileB to fileA again.
If it’s a function that’s only filling a buffer, then we only need to intercept
...HasReturned function. This case will lead to execution of the function per-
fectly by the guest OS. However, returned value will be modified by our mech-
anisms. This would perfectly work, in places where the associated value is not
vital, or can be used as a parameter. For example ProductID is not associated
with any other file, or it’s not a key for another registry value.
If any manipulated value, is a key for another value this scenario should
be handled accordingly. We cannot simply randomize all values. For example,
network adapters in Windows are stored with keys in the form of UUID. This
values, later used by other functions to access corresponding network adapter.
Same rules apply for the system users and groups. We may not simply alter
these values randomly, or obeying a specific format.
UUIDs or UUID like resources stored in registry and have the role of being
a key to another resource should be tracked by a separate unit. They should be
randomized, and when they’re used as a parameter they should return into their
original value. Another point to consider is obeying formatting rules. We should
conserve properties of the original value.
Finally these manipulation is only done if the calling binary is under analysis.
Normal Windows routines do not interfere with randomized behavior of native
functions.
4.5.4 File Dates
Figures regarding dates defined section 4.4.2 should be scattered over a time
space in Anubis. Modification dates of the files and creation dates should be
randomized.
We can make changes regarding installation date, and a total randomization.
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Date Number of Files created
2007-11-01 82
2007-11-02 500
2007-10-22 3086
2007-10-23 105
2007-10-18 6704
2007-10-19 11177
Table 4.6: Creation dates in Anubis
Installation date can be calculated using creation times of files in WINDOWS direc-
tory. They can be shifted.
For example, from the table 4.6 we can clearly conclude installation is started
on 2007-10-18. We can use this as a base for our randomization. Adding a specific
amount of time we can shift installation date. However this will preserve time
delta between files. Which is another fingerprint. A solution to this problem can
be defining two time deltas. ∆days defines shift in installation date in days and
∆seconds defines shift in seconds. Resulting new file date. rb in equation 4.3 was
defined in 4.1.
∆seconds =
HASH(filename)
HASHMAX
∗MAX SECONDS (4.2)
∆days =
rb
HASHMAX
∗ (DATECurrent −DATEInitial) (4.3)
timefile = ∆days +∆seconds + DATEInitial (4.4)
Application of these methods over the ones defined in section 4.5.3 can be
summarized as follows.
File operations are done with HANDLES in Windows operating systems. File
name is associated with handles, which are 32bit words. Handles to files are
obtained using NtCreateFile function. Later versions of Windows has additional
NtCreateFileTransacted function also.
Invoking this function registers handle on the DateRandomizer. Queries
regarding file information are done with GetFileInformationByHandle and
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Id Key Mask
1 HKLM\Software\...xxx\Randomizable Key1 ...DDD
2 HKLM\Software\...xxx\Randomizable Key2 HH.3
Table 4.7: Sample randomizable registry keys and randomization masks.
GetFileInformationByHandleEx. Functions. By creating a GetFileAttributesHasReturned
function we can randomize date information stored in LPBY HANDLE FILE INFORMATION
structure.
However, if a setter method is invoked on active file handle, we can safely
drop the file from the list of DateRandomizer.
4.5.5 Windows Registry
Very similarly to file system functions, registry functions work on handle basis.
This time handles are created using NtCreateKey NtOpenKey or NtOpenKeyEx
calls. While obtaining handles, key names are checked against randomization
list. If key is marked as randomizable, method defined in section 4.5.3 can be
applied to value obtaining functions in registry.
Functions to be intercepted in registry are NtQueryKey and NtQueryValueKey.
While keys are known to store values only close look at the Registry API lead
to storage of modification date associated with the key. So date randomization
algorithm also can be applied to registry keys defined in equation 4.4.
NtQueryKey on the other hand actually retrieves data. The information re-
trieved by this function should be randomized according to it’s data type. This
marker is one of KEY VALUE INFORMATION CLASS’s members. Which are defined in
2.1. Attention should be paid to only changing successful calls. Key corresponds
to unique resource identifier.
Additions we propose to registry system is as follows. We collect randomizable
entries in database. Key and value names are combined in a single string with
randomization masks.
CHAPTER 4. STEALTH ANUBIS 47
Below there are some proposals for randomization regarding value types.
4.5.5.1 String, Multi-String
Substation or randomization of last 4 bits may be used. ASCII characters are
is 7bit. We don’t want to change the type of character. A → B can be pretty
normal but 3→ A conversation may cause to failures. Since an integer might be
saved as ASCII in it’s decimal notation. According to this scenario this would also
cause for hex base representations. Possible mappings may include ([0 − F ] →
[0− F ], [0− 9]→ [0− 9]). For every byte we must design a byte class preserving
mask. For multi-string same rules might be applied.
4.5.5.2 Unicode String
Same rules as string may be applied. Unicode strings may have double bytes for
defining a single character. Since we don’t want to change family of characters
we may alter only last byte.
4.5.5.3 DWORD, QWORD
Changing last 4 bits may be an option. Position of bits may depends whether
it’s little endian ( REG DWORD, REG DWORD LITTLE ENDIAN ) or it’s big
endian ( REG DWORD BIG ENDIAN ). For QWORD we can also use this.
4.5.5.4 Blob & Binary Data
Changing last bit of every byte may be an option. But possibly there exists
formatting rules for any sort of blob.
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4.5.6 Network
QEMU has embedded QEMU MAC hard coded is 52-54-00-12-34-56 router
MAC. Since it’s QEMU specific and hard coded it can only be used as a fingerprint
of QEMU. But the MAC address of router or computers can be used to track
environment. However MAC addresses can be instantly changed. If guest ARP
cache is flushed before analysis, there will be no trace of MAC addresses.
Anubis VM can be set to re-obtain MAC address from a DHCP server. This
way we eliminate IP level blocking. However, if any connection to outside world
is permitted network paths may be blacklisted by malware authors.
4.5.7 File Randomizer
A good idea is randomizing file blocks also. It’s not implemented but for changing
hashes of files, few bytes can be changed. This can be done with the same call
interception approach. Instead of using a pattern, we may define offsets for
randomizable data points. Even a single bit change will change file hash.
This assumption is based on malware being not able to verify file contents.
It’s clearly unfeasible for us to detect such points. But a generic construct that
changes few bytes will resolve a big problem.
Implementation of this can be done by intercepting NtFileRead function.
Getting file handle is by hooking of NtCreateFile or NtOpenFile. We can check
if the currently read block is containing any randomizable byte. And apply a
randomization policy to a specific byte sequence.
Chapter 5
Experiments & Evaluation
While experimenting and evaluating our work, we used two malware samples
captured by Anubis installation hosted by International Secure Systems Lab.
The samples are known to detect Anubis.
The procedure followed is as follows: First we analyzed the samples with Anu-
bis and generated initial reports. After the initial analysis we used reverse engi-
neering techniques for static analysis. Procedure steps include extracting strings
from samples, extracting imported functions, disassembling samples, determining
detection policies and re-analyzing samples with modified Anubis.
Main tools used for static analysis are objdump from mingw32 port of binutils
package, and IDA-Free. These tools were previously introduced in Section 2.2.
Objdump is used is used to display information from object files. Including head-
ers, section headers, disassembled code, relocation entries. Objdump as compared
to nm gives more possibilities and information about the binary. IDA has a nice
GUI and a better disassembly engine. IDA also makes navigation through the
assembly code of the binary. It has visual aids to support navigation.
Windows binaries are in PE format. This format consists of several headers
and sections. For example .text holds executable code. Another section is
IAT where the information of imported functions from external DLLs are stored.
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Offsets of entry points and function names are stored in these tables. These
sections can be viewed with either IDA or objdump.
For searching strings in binary strings program is used. It searches and
prints minimum of 4 consecutive printable characters in a file.
For obtaining information from binary files we used objdump. To see the
imports we invoked binary as follows.
$ i586-mingw32msvc-objdump -p sample1.exe
Generated import lists for sample1.exe are in Table 5.1, Table 5.2, Table 5.3.
sample2.exe has imports from a single file only which is shown in Table5.4.
5.1 Sample 1
Sample execution is clearly terminated in Anubis. The output to console is
Anubis detected... This output clearly indicates the detection of Anubis.
Hash information for sample1 is as follows:
MD5: 722ec327d827ca34f51b7073ca7c23c2
SHA1: 4c6acc804e89edfb0053a5a105a41617f2a9ddfe
Imported function list at Table 5.1, Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 gives us clues.
For example there’s an enumeration of processes 1, a window search 2, obtaining
username 3, and time related operations 4
Additionally and more surprisingly we see 25 functions having names with
Is prefix in table 5.5. Simple execution of strings5 command reveals few strings
1Process32First, Process32Next functions are used to enumerate process list
2FindWindowA
3GetUserNameA
4GetTickCount
5member of binutils package to extract strings from a given file
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vma Hint/Ord Member-Name Bound-To
4e408 9 AllocConsole
4e418 53 CopyFileA
4e424 87 CreateSemaphoreA
4e438 93 CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
4e454 155 ExitProcess
4e464 175 FindAtomA
4e470 213 FreeLibrary
4e480 220 GetAtomNameA
4e490 281 GetCurrentProcess
4e4a4 323 GetLastError
4e4b4 333 GetModuleFileNameA
4e4cc 335 GetModuleHandleA
4e4e0 362 GetProcAddress
4e4f4 421 GetTickCount
4e504 494 InterlockedDecrement
4e51c 498 InterlockedIncrement
4e534 522 LoadLibraryA
4e544 583 Process32First
4e558 585 Process32Next
4e568 617 ReadProcessMemory
4e57c 626 ReleaseSemaphore
4e590 709 SetLastError
4e5a0 735 SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
4e5c0 747 Sleep
4e5c8 759 TlsAlloc
4e5d4 760 TlsFree
4e5e0 761 TlsGetValue
4e5f0 762 TlsSetValue
4e600 805 WaitForSingleObject
Table 5.1: Imports of sample1.exe from kernel32.dll
vma Hint/Ord Member-Name Bound-To
4e3c8 245 GetUserNameA
4e3d8 389 RegCreateKeyA
4e3e8 432 RegSetValueExA
Table 5.2: Imports of sample1.exe from advapi32.dll
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vma Hint/Ord Member-Name Bound-To
4e8e8 209 FindWindowA
4e8f8 222 GetAsyncKeyState
4e90c 577 ShowWindow
Table 5.3: Imports of sample1.exe from user32.dll
containing detected. Full list is: Anubis, Threat Expert, JoeBox, Norman,
Wireshark, Kaspersky, iDEFENSE sysAnalyzer, Sunbelt, Sandboxie, Virtual
PC, Virtual Box, WPE Pro and some others.
This instance of malware simply detects, defense systems, detection systems,
virtualization systems and honey net systems. Since our focus is on Anubis stealth
execution we’ll focus on Anubis detection methods used by this malware instance.
IsAnubis function entry is located at offset 0x00401662 of text segment. It
performs several checks for Anubis installation fingerprints. If any of the symp-
toms matches then function is terminated, and binary stops execution. But for
authors of this malware preferred to print Anubis Detected... to stdout.
Malware first checks whether the binary is running inside the directory
C:\InsideTM\. This is comes from the design of TTanalyze. This check returns
false since Anubis does not need and use this folder.
The second check used for detection by this malware is file name. Also this
check belongs to historical reasons. Initial TTanalyze design was capable of ex-
ecuting files with name sample.exe since it’s not mandatory with new version
this check is also useless.
Third control is current username. GetUserNameA function is called to retrieve
name of the user executing current process in guest operating system. Default
Anubis installation executes suspect binaries with user account named “user”.
In Anubis architecture we can achieve overwriting this value by manipulating
GetUserNameAHasReturned function Code can be seen in Figure 5.1. This func-
tion is not implemented normally, we extend our Randomizer class to implement
GetUserNameAInterface.
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vma Hint/Ord Member-Name Bound-To
65a0 276 GetComputerNameA
65c2 272 GetCommandLineA
65d4 488 GetVersion
65e2 185 ExitProcess
65f0 862 TerminateProcess
6604 322 GetCurrentProcess
6618 878 UnhandledExceptionFilter
6634 381 GetModuleFileNameA
664a 246 FreeEnvironmentStringsA
6664 247 FreeEnvironmentStringsW
667e 916 WideCharToMultiByte
6694 341 GetEnvironmentStrings
66ac 343 GetEnvironmentStringsW
66c6 804 SetHandleCount
66d8 441 GetStdHandle
66e8 358 GetFileType
66f6 439 GetStartupInfoA
6708 383 GetModuleHandleA
671c 344 GetEnvironmentVariableA
6736 489 GetVersionExA
6746 532 HeapDestroy
6754 530 HeapCreate
6762 899 VirtualFree
6770 534 HeapFree
677c 727 RtlUnwind
6788 932 WriteFile
6794 528 HeapAlloc
67a0 260 GetCPInfo
67ac 253 GetACP
67b6 403 GetOEMCP
67c2 897 VirtualAlloc
67d2 538 HeapReAlloc
67e0 416 GetProcAddress
67f2 594 LoadLibraryA
6802 369 GetLastError
6812 238 FlushFileBuffers
6826 795 SetFilePointer
6838 629 MultiByteToWideChar
684e 580 LCMapStringA
685e 581 LCMapStringW
686e 442 GetStringTypeA
6880 445 GetStringTypeW
6892 823 SetStdHandle
68a2 52 CloseHandle
Table 5.4: Imports of sample2.exe from kernel32.dll
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position name
004014b2 Z10IsUsernameSs
0040455c Z11IsAutostartPKc
00401614 Z11IsFileExistSs
004021dc Z11IsKasperskyv
004028ac Z11IsSandboxiev
004020ae Z11IsWireSharkv
0040156e Z13IsFolderExistSs
0040150c Z14IsFileInFolderPKc
004013e8 Z16IsProcessRunningSs
004015a0 Z19IsFileNameEqualThisSs
0040230a Z4IsIDv
00401b86 Z4IsJBv
0040192a Z4IsTEv
00402a48 Z4IsVBv
00402d02 Z5IsAllv
004029f4 Z5IsEmuv
00402ff2 Z5IsLogv
004028e4 Z5IsVPCv
00402b76 Z5IsWPEv
00402974 Z7IsOtherv
00401662 Z8IsAnubisv
00401e1a Z8IsNormanv
00401a58 Z9IsSandboxv
004025e6 Z9IsSunbeltv
Table 5.5: Functions with possible analysis names.
target::GetUserNameADecoder *dec =
dynamic_cast<target::GetUserNameADecoder*>(
fCoordinator->getCurrentDecoderObject());
target::VirtualAddress va;
va = dec->getlpBuffer_addr();
uint8_t *tPtr1 = (uint8_t *)"test";
vSys->writeMemory(va, 4, tPtr1);
Figure 5.1: Manipulation of GetUserNameA function
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This code block in Figure 5.1 returns test instead of user. For sample1
manipulating only GetUserNameA function defeats Anubis detection mechanism.
Initially the activities tag in the analysis report is empty:
<activities> </activities>
After modification report contains following entries:
<activities>
<registry_activities>
<reg_value_modified count="1" description="auto_start"
key="HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
value_data="C:\WINDOWS\z_antivir.exe" value_name="z_antivir"/>
</registry_activities>
<file_activities>
<file_created name="C:\WINDOWS\z_antivir.exe"/>
<file_created name="C:\WINDOWS\z_antivir.log"/>
<file_read name="C:\WINDOWS\z_antivir.log"/>
<file_read name="C:\sample1.exe"/>
</file_activities>
<misc_activities>
<mutex_created name="CTF.TimListCache.FMPDefaultS-1-5-21-
1229272821-1004336348-527237240-1003MUTEX.
DefaultS-1-5-21-1229272821-1004336348-527237240-1003"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_BACK (8)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_TAB (9)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="undefined (10)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="undefined (11)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_CLEAR (12)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_RETURN (13)"/>
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Computername USER
Honeypot [ANUBIS]
Figure 5.2: Initial stdout output of sample2
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="undefined (14)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_MULTIPLY (106)"/>
...
</misc_activities>
</activities>
Full report is available in Appendix.
5.2 Sample 2
Initial output can be seen in Figure 5.2. This output indicates detection of Anubis.
Analysis report also shows us binary just reads a single registry key. Which holds
ComputerName 6.
File hash information is as follows
MD5: ada52b41dab750dab2d057b7f2a2117d
SHA1: 9fd6089a6f63a607770945ebf1d85b656d344bf1
Imported functions from kernel32 are shown in Table 5.4. If we associate
what we obtained from stdout output with the imported calls, we may agree that
GetComputerNameA function is called to obtain computer name for the Anubis.
This also gives us the clue that GetComputerNameA function uses native API calls
to extract computer name from Windows Registry.
6HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ComputerName\ActiveComputerName
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String
not Honeypot
Honeypot [ANUBIS]
USER
Honeypot [THREAT EXPERT]
COMPUTERNAME
Computername %s
Table 5.6: Interesting strings in sample2
Extracted strings are seen in Table 5.6. We see that Binary is able to detect
Threat Expert7 and Anubis. It achieves this task by using ComputerName.
From the reversed code we can say that ThreatExpert system uses COMPUTERNAME
as computer name and Anubis uses USER. However the accuracy of comparing
the name of the computer with a string is questionable. Full disassembly of main
function is in Appendix.
7“ThreatExpert (patent pending) is an advanced automated threat analysis system
(ATAS) designed to analyze and report the behavior of computer viruses, worms, tro-
jans, ad-ware, spy-ware, and other security-related risks in a fully automated mode.”
http://www.threatexpert.com
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis we studied fingerprinting and detection methods for Anubis. We
proposed mechanism to eliminate fingerprints on the fly, by modifying values
returned by Windows operating system.
Our efforts regarding mapping differences in identical installations of Windows
lead to more distinction than we initially thought. Nearly 10% of files are different
in installations with identical setup parameters. Even registry key has a special
date stored, which makes every key a possible fingerprint.
Additionally every piece of installed software or even every day the computer
has been running leaves trails that can be considered as a fingerprint. A file
located in a directory which is not a part of any installation is also a fingerprint.
Malware has limitless options for fingerprinting. It may even trace the days
the computer is active by looking at file dates. If malware chooses not to run on
inactive computers, computers that have been running for only few days, it only
a looses a limited amount of active computers. For malware it is very important
that it is active and can spread itself. If it applies a non-greedy approach and
carefully inspects systems, it will take much longer to include it in anti-virus
vendors’ databases.
According to our studies full elimination of fingerprint is not feasible. This
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work eliminates known detection schemes and probably a few further ones. But
in a public installation possible fingerprinting options are limitless. Only if a
public system has a private installation, one with a different fingerprint, malware
will probably fail hide itself.
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Appendix A
Data
A.1 Analysis Report
Analysis report of sample1.exe after the modification:
<activities>
<registry_activities>
<reg_value_modified count="1" description="auto_start"
key="HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
value_data="C:\WINDOWS\z_antivir.exe" value_name="z_antivir"/>
</registry_activities>
<file_activities>
<file_created name="C:\WINDOWS\z_antivir.exe"/>
<file_created name="C:\WINDOWS\z_antivir.log"/>
<file_read name="C:\WINDOWS\z_antivir.log"/>
<file_read name="C:\sample1.exe"/>
</file_activities>
<misc_activities>
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<mutex_created name="CTF.TimListCache.FMPDefaultS-1-5-21-
1229272821-1004336348-527237240-1003MUTEX.
DefaultS-1-5-21-1229272821-1004336348-527237240-1003"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_BACK (8)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_TAB (9)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="undefined (10)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="undefined (11)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_CLEAR (12)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_RETURN (13)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="undefined (14)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="undefined (15)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_SHIFT (16)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_CONTROL (17)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_MENU (18)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_PAUSE (19)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_CAPITAL (20)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_HANGUL (21)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="undefined (22)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_JUNJA (23)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_FINAL (24)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_KANJI (25)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="undefined (26)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_ESCAPE (27)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_CONVERT (28)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_NONCONVERT (29)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_ACCEPT (30)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_MODECHANGE (31)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_SPACE (32)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_PRIOR (33)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_NEXT (34)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_END (35)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_HOME (36)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_LEFT (37)"/>
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<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_UP (38)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_RIGHT (39)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_DOWN (40)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_SELECT (41)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_PRINT (42)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_EXECUTE (43)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_SNAPSHOT (44)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_INSERT (45)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_DELETE (46)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_HELP (47)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_0 (48)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_1 (49)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7166" key="VK_2 (50)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_3 (51)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_4 (52)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_5 (53)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_6 (54)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_7 (55)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_8 (56)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_9 (57)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (58)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (59)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (60)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (61)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (62)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (63)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (64)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_A (65)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_B (66)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_C (67)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_D (68)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_E (69)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F (70)"/>
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<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_G (71)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_H (72)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_I (73)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_J (74)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_K (75)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_L (76)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_M (77)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_N (78)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_O (79)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_P (80)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_Q (81)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_R (82)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_S (83)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_T (84)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_U (85)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_V (86)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_W (87)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_X (88)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_Y (89)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_Z (90)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_LWIN (91)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_RWIN (92)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_APPS (93)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (94)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_SLEEP (95)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_NUMPAD0 (96)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_NUMPAD1 (97)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_NUMPAD2 (98)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_NUMPAD3 (99)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_NUMPAD4 (100)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_NUMPAD5 (101)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_NUMPAD6 (102)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_NUMPAD7 (103)"/>
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<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_NUMPAD8 (104)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_NUMPAD9 (105)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_MULTIPLY (106)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_ADD (107)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_SEPARATOR (108)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_SUBTRACT (109)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_DECIMAL (110)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_DIVIDE (111)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F1 (112)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F2 (113)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F3 (114)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F4 (115)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F5 (116)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F6 (117)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F7 (118)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F8 (119)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F9 (120)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F10 (121)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F11 (122)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F12 (123)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F13 (124)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F14 (125)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F15 (126)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F16 (127)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F17 (128)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F18 (129)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F19 (130)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F20 (131)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F21 (132)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F22 (133)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F23 (134)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_F24 (135)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (136)"/>
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<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (137)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (138)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (139)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (140)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (141)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (142)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (143)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_NUMLOCK (144)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_SCROLL (145)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (146)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (147)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (148)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (149)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (150)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (151)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (152)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (153)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (154)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (155)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (156)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (157)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (158)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (159)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_LSHIFT (160)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_RSHIFT (161)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_LCONTROL (162)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_RCONTROL (163)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_LMENU (164)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_RMENU (165)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_BROWSER_BACK (166)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_BROWSER_FORWARD (167)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_BROWSER_REFRESH (168)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_BROWSER_STOP (169)"/>
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<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_BROWSER_SEARCH (170)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_BROWSER_FAVORITES (171)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_BROWSER_HOME (172)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_VOLUME_MUTE (173)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_VOLUME_DOWN (174)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_VOLUME_UP (175)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_MEDIA_NEXT_TRACK (176)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_MEDIA_PREV_TRACK (177)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_MEDIA_STOP (178)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_MEDIA_PLAY_PAUSE (179)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_LAUNCH_MAIL (180)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_LAUNCH_MEDIA_SELECT (181)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_LAUNCH_APP1 (182)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_LAUNCH_APP2 (183)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (184)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (185)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_OEM_1 (186)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_OEM_PLUS (187)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_OEM_COMMA (188)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_OEM_MINUS (189)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_OEM_PERIOD (190)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_OEM_2 (191)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_OEM_3 (192)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (193)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (194)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (195)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (196)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (197)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (198)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (199)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (200)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (201)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (202)"/>
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<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (203)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (204)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (205)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (206)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (207)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (208)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (209)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (210)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (211)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (212)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (213)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (214)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (215)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (216)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (217)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="undefined (218)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_OEM_4 (219)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_OEM_5 (220)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_OEM_6 (221)"/>
<key_was_checked count="7165" key="VK_OEM_7 (222)"/>
</misc_activities>
</activities>
A.2 Disassembled Code
Disassembly of main function of sample2.exe:
.text:00401000 ; int __cdecl main(int argc,const char **argv,const char *envp)
.text:00401000 _main proc near ; CODE XREF: start+AFp
.text:00401000
.text:00401000 nSize = dword ptr -104h
.text:00401000 Buffer = byte ptr -100h
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.text:00401000 argc = dword ptr 4
.text:00401000 argv = dword ptr 8
.text:00401000 envp = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:00401000
.text:00401000 sub esp, 104h
.text:00401006 push ebx
.text:00401007 lea eax, [esp+108h+nSize]
.text:0040100B push esi
.text:0040100C lea ecx, [esp+10Ch+Buffer]
.text:00401010 push eax ; nSize
.text:00401011 push ecx ; lpBuffer
.text:00401012 mov [esp+114h+nSize], 100h
.text:0040101A call ds:GetComputerNameA
.text:00401020 lea edx, [esp+10Ch+Buffer]
.text:00401024 push edx
.text:00401025 push offset aComputernameS ; "Computername %s\r\n"
.text:0040102A call _printf
.text:0040102F add esp, 8
.text:00401032 mov esi, offset aComputername ; "COMPUTERNAME"
.text:00401037 lea eax, [esp+10Ch+Buffer]
.text:0040103B
.text:0040103B loc_40103B: ; CODE XREF: _main+5Dj
.text:0040103B mov dl, [eax]
.text:0040103D mov bl, [esi]
.text:0040103F mov cl, dl
.text:00401041 cmp dl, bl
.text:00401043 jnz short loc_401063
.text:00401045 test cl, cl
.text:00401047 jz short loc_40105F
.text:00401049 mov dl, [eax+1]
.text:0040104C mov bl, [esi+1]
.text:0040104F mov cl, dl
.text:00401051 cmp dl, bl
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.text:00401053 jnz short loc_401063
.text:00401055 add eax, 2
.text:00401058 add esi, 2
.text:0040105B test cl, cl
.text:0040105D jnz short loc_40103B
.text:0040105F
.text:0040105F loc_40105F: ; CODE XREF: _main+47j
.text:0040105F xor eax, eax
.text:00401061 jmp short loc_401068
.text:00401063 ; ------------------------------------------------
.text:00401063
.text:00401063 loc_401063: ; CODE XREF: _main+43j
.text:00401063 ; _main+53j
.text:00401063 sbb eax, eax
.text:00401065 sbb eax, 0FFFFFFFFh
.text:00401068
.text:00401068 loc_401068: ; CODE XREF: _main+61j
.text:00401068 test eax, eax
.text:0040106A jnz short loc_401082
.text:0040106C push offset aHoneypotThreat ; "Honeypot [THREAT EXPERT]"
.text:00401071 call _printf
.text:00401076 add esp, 4
.text:00401079 pop esi
.text:0040107A pop ebx
.text:0040107B add esp, 104h
.text:00401081 retn
.text:00401082 ; ------------------------------------------------
.text:00401082
.text:00401082 loc_401082: ; CODE XREF: _main+6Aj
.text:00401082 mov esi, offset aUser ; "USER"
.text:00401087 lea eax, [esp+10Ch+Buffer]
.text:0040108B
.text:0040108B loc_40108B: ; CODE XREF: _main+ADj
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.text:0040108B mov dl, [eax]
.text:0040108D mov bl, [esi]
.text:0040108F mov cl, dl
.text:00401091 cmp dl, bl
.text:00401093 jnz short loc_4010B3
.text:00401095 test cl, cl
.text:00401097 jz short loc_4010AF
.text:00401099 mov dl, [eax+1]
.text:0040109C mov bl, [esi+1]
.text:0040109F mov cl, dl
.text:004010A1 cmp dl, bl
.text:004010A3 jnz short loc_4010B3
.text:004010A5 add eax, 2
.text:004010A8 add esi, 2
.text:004010AB test cl, cl
.text:004010AD jnz short loc_40108B
.text:004010AF
.text:004010AF loc_4010AF: ; CODE XREF: _main+97j
.text:004010AF xor eax, eax
.text:004010B1 jmp short loc_4010B8
.text:004010B3 ; ------------------------------------------------
.text:004010B3
.text:004010B3 loc_4010B3: ; CODE XREF: _main+93j
.text:004010B3 ; _main+A3j
.text:004010B3 sbb eax, eax
.text:004010B5 sbb eax, 0FFFFFFFFh
.text:004010B8
.text:004010B8 loc_4010B8: ; CODE XREF: _main+B1j
.text:004010B8 test eax, eax
.text:004010BA jnz short loc_4010D2
.text:004010BC push offset aHoneypotAnubis ; "Honeypot [ANUBIS]"
.text:004010C1 call _printf
.text:004010C6 add esp, 4
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.text:004010C9 pop esi
.text:004010CA pop ebx
.text:004010CB add esp, 104h
.text:004010D1 retn
.text:004010D2 ; ------------------------------------------------
.text:004010D2
.text:004010D2 loc_4010D2: ; CODE XREF: _main+BAj
.text:004010D2 push offset aNotHoneypot ; "not Honeypot"
.text:004010D7 call _printf
.text:004010DC add esp, 4
.text:004010DF pop esi
.text:004010E0 pop ebx
.text:004010E1 add esp, 104h
.text:004010E7 retn
.text:004010E7 _main endp
.text:004010E7
.text:004010E7 ; ------------------------------------------------
